Interview With Jendayi Frazer About US police on Africa
Jendayi Frazer who specializes in security issues in Africa, spent also working with the National Security Council and the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Africa policy.
What are the primary strategic considerations driving American policy on
Africa?
Frazer: Firstly, Africa is part of our global
strategy; it is not separate and distinct. Africa is not treated as an area for
humanitarian interest. We are interested in Africa just as we are interested in
any other area: it is a mainstream policy.
Secondly, there is lot of
discussion of pre 9-11, post 9-11 policy, but frankly there is tremendous
continuity in our Africa policy, and it is based on the president’s global
paradigm, which is to make the world safer, and to make the world
better.
On the safer side that was always a focus on weapons of mass
destruction, counter terrorism and tyranny. On the better side, it was an
economic agenda, a free trade agenda, health and education. Those two
overarching objectives continue, and frame up our Africa policy.
In terms
of helping countries with multi-year planning, the approach of the MCA is
country ownership; it is a compact, and some of the reason for the slowness is
the countries have to write their compact. They have to tell us how they want to
use the money. We will focus that money in their areas of priority. It has built
in acknowledgement of the need for country ownership and
accountability.
Can anything concrete come out of the G8 summit, given
these kinds of differences, or should countries get on with their own
initiatives?
Frazer: A lot can come out of the G8 process.
First of all the Commission for Africa report is just that, a report. The G8
process has already had the Africa Action Plan in place. The Commission for
Africa is not the basis for the conversation at the G8. But there are areas
where we should work together. For instance, debt relief: we are probably at the
point where we should conclude an agreement. I think we are close, particularly
the US and Britain, to agreement on 100% debt cancellation. We should also give
grants [through the International Development Agency of the World Bank], no more
loans, and African countries should support this, because the recipients can’t
pay back the loans.
Why can’t we do that at the G8?
Frazer: That would be an immediate structural reform that would
benefit Africa. Why can’t we as the G8 agree to the elimination of 100% of
agricultural subsidies? That is something we should commit ourselves to
seriously.
How do we finance regional peacekeeping operations?
Frazer: The past four or five [missions] have been African
countries going in the lead, and we scramble around to finance
them.
Why can’t the African Development Bank reform and increase
financing so it can be the mechanism for operationalizing the Nepad vision on
governance and infrastructure?
Frazer: Those are the structural changes that would be long
lasting; it’s not the arbitrary “we need 25-billion by 20 something or other”
approach. Africans also want reform at other multilateral institutions such as
the World Bank and, not least of all, more of a voice. I understand the desire
for greater voice in terms of governance in international institutions. Frankly,
the US is under -represented. If you base it on the share of our economy, we are
under-represented in the International Monetary Fund, so I represent an under
represented constituency there [laughs]. Some of the European countries should
have less of a share — their economies have actually shrunk — the US should have
more of a share, and probably some developing countries should have more of a
share. I am sympathetic; I don’t know where it will go.
Do you
have a view on the expanding role of China in Africa?
Frazer: I
don’t think the US has any policy vis-à-vis China’s role in Africa. Maybe over
time we’ll develop one. Certainly we saw that China played a role in Sudan, and
not a very positive role, in terms of trying to get oil out, and allowing the
government to continue with atrocities toward the south. There are issues
relating to China in Zimbabwe. So it is a question of how will China play on the
governance issues.
Will it buy the Monterey Consensus that the other major economies have set
up as a mutually agreed relationship with African
countries?
Frazer: We should encourage them, and
African governments should encourage them, because good governance is absolutely
essential. Another area is on the nature of the trade relationship. China is
looking at extractive industries; we are trying to move Africa toward
value-added exports.
So how will China transform? Certainly China needs to be a good corporate citizen and sign up to international standards. We can encourage them. And if they are invited to the G8, we should make that an issue.
What is the appropriate role of the United Nations as peacekeeper in
Africa? Can the U.N. be effective?
Frazer: The U.N.'s
role in Africa as peacekeeper is the same as in other parts of the world: to
promote peaceful co-existence among sovereign states. Sometimes ending civil
wars is a prerequisite for both regional and international peace and security
and therefore is widely accepted as falling within the U.N.'s original mandate.
But for the U.N. to be effective, Member States need to provide the necessary
resources in a timely manner and the U.N. bureaucracy needs to move
expeditiously.
What kind of setback does this pose to U.S. policy toward Africa?
Frazer:
Congress has been extremely reluctant to approve and fund U.N. peacekeeping
operations in Africa since the U.N. operations in Somalia from 1992-1995 which
ended with U.S. soldiers being dragged through the street. The problems in
Sierra Leone will likely reinforce Congress’s reluctance. Unfortunately it has
forced the administration to consistently low-ball their peacekeeping funding
requests from Congress. This has resulted in a patchwork funding strategy that
undermines both effective engagement with the United Nations and hampers a
proactive and efficient U.S. policy toward Africa.
What is an appropriate mission for peacekeepers in
Africa?
Frazer: There are two basic mandates that guide
U.N. peacekeepers. Chapter 6 assumes a peaceful environment where troops are
just there to monitor the carrying out of a peace agreement. The chapter 7
mandate means ensuring peace through armed enforcement, which requires heavy
armament and a different type of training and is a more expensive operation.
Because most of the Africa's wars are internal where it is not clear if rebel
factions will adhere to a peace agreement, Chapter 7 is most often called
for.
How has the role of peacekeepers changed in
Africa?
Frazer: The biggest change has been the
unwillingness of Western countries to provide troops to African peacekeeping.
Peacekeeping in Africa has been relegated to Third World countries. No NATO
members contributed troops to Sierra Leone. The United States will only send
troops to Africa for humanitarian and disaster relief or to evacuate its
citizens, but not to keep peace. So what this means is some of the world’s most
capable military forces in terms of training and equipment are just not
available for African peacekeeping.
Why has there been such an increase in violence toward U.N. peacekeepers
in Africa?
Frazer: All U.N. peacekeepers operate under the
threat of violence. But in Africa rebels have repeatedly seen the U.N. Security
Council's lack of political will or staying power. I believe that part of the
rebels’ strategy is to kill or kidnap U.N. forces to quickly end the U.N.
mission. This was certainly the outcome in both Somalia and Rwanda.